Peace and Conflict Studies
Volume 24

Number 2

Article 4

10-2017

U.S. Domestic Vulnerability and the Supply of Third-Party
Mediation
James P. Todhunter
Troy University, jtodhunter@troy.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs
Part of the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons

This Article has supplementary content. View the full record on NSUWorks here:
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol24/iss2/4
Recommended Citation
Todhunter, James P. (2017) "U.S. Domestic Vulnerability and the Supply of Third-Party Mediation," Peace
and Conflict Studies: Vol. 24 : No. 2 , Article 4.
DOI: 10.46743/1082-7307/2017.1422
Available at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol24/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Peace & Conflict Studies at NSUWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Peace and Conflict Studies by
an authorized editor of NSUWorks. For more information,
please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.
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Abstract
Abstract
Most U.S. presidents will pursue third-party conflict mediation sometime during their administration.
However, the approach and level of commitment to those endeavors vary greatly across time and results
are often minimally successful. This study explains this variation in terms of domestic political
considerations, suggesting that the potential risks and payoffs in the domestic sphere primarily drive the
supply of mediation, rather than conflict characteristics, “ripeness” for resolution, or the national interest.
Presidents are shown to engage in mediation when they are relatively secure domestically, enjoying
legislative success in Congress. The results are consistent with the notion that presidents prefer political
cover when engaging in foreign policy. Thus, the argument informs the literature on mediator behavior by
linking it with theories of foreign policy decision making and suggests that the political context in which
mediation is offered will influence its prospects for success, often explaining why mediation efforts fall
short. Moreover, given the trend toward divided government in the United States, the results presented
here suggest that mediation will become less prevalent in U.S. foreign policy.
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James P. Todhunter

Mediation is a popular conflict management strategy that is thought to be appealing to
disputing parties because it is flexible and non-binding in nature. Similarly, because of its
powerful position in the international system, the United States of America is a popular mediator
because of its broad political influence and considerable political, economic, and military
resources to commit to any conflict resolution endeavor. However, despite its appeal and
prevalence as a conflict management strategy, empirically, mediation efforts are often
unsuccessful, even when success is measured by small incremental steps. Moreover, powerful
states like the U.S., which can exercise more influence and introduce incentives to the belligerent
parties, are no more successful in mediating conflicts than weaker states. This study seeks to
contribute to the understanding of third-party mediation dynamics by examining the U.S. case
and focusing on how domestic political vulnerability influences the decision to engage in
mediation. To do so, the literature on third-party mediation is tied with the literature on foreign
policy decision-making. Moreover, focus is given specifically to arguments suggesting that
leaders make such decisions primarily with their domestic political impact in mind. Examining
two sources of domestic vulnerability, (a) the executive’s level of legislative support and (b) the
proximity of elections, and considering theories of foreign policy decision-making, the empirical
results suggest that U.S. presidents are more likely to engage in mediation at times when they
enjoy broad political support in Congress. The influence of election cycles on mediation
behavior yield no statistically significant relationship. Such findings suggest that presidents are
constrained by their domestic political circumstances, and that the decision to focus on
diplomacy is driven and constrained by the domestic political costs likely to be incurred, but also
that presidents are not seeking to use mediation as a tool to rally the public for re-election.
Recent scholarship on conflict resolution processes has recognized the need for a greater
understanding of the motivations of third-party mediators, especially state actors as mediators, as
those motivations likely have implications for both how a mediation process might proceed and
its prospects for success. To that end, significant attempts have been made to understand and
explain states’ motivations as mediators (Beardsley & Greig, 2009; Melin, 2014; Melin, Gartner,
& Bercovitch, 2013; Greig, 2005; Greig & Regan, 2008, Maoz and Terris, 2006). In each of

these cases, however, the arguments have conceived mediator motivations in terms of state
interests and relationships, such as economic ties, historical ties, alliances, and conflict
characteristics. As such, mediator motivations are often seen as one-dimensional. Where
motivations are cast as dynamic, the dynamics are driven by structure-level factors. Domestic
political factors are not appropriately considered, and therefore are unable to provide a complete
explanation of the variation in mediator motivations across time, especially regarding variations
in approach to the same, ongoing conflict. For instance, most U.S. presidents have sought to
mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at some point during their administration, but there has
been considerable variation in approach and level of commitment across administrations, even
though Israel is considered an important U.S. ally, and that success in resolving the conflict
would likely pay dividends for U.S. foreign policy in the region. As such, much of the mediation
research cannot incorporate the emerging consensus in the literature that suggests that foreign
policy decisions are made primarily with domestic ramifications is mind (Ostrom & Job, 1986;
Putnam, 1989; Chiozza & Goemans, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow,
2003). As such, domestic political conditions create both incentives for, and constraints on, the
decision to offer and engage in mediation. This study addresses the questions of varying
commitment and strategy in mediation by linking theories of mediator motivation to those of
foreign policy as a two-level game—arguing that domestic political factors drive mediator
behavior. Specifically, the offer of mediation is likely to be extended at times when there is
sufficient legislative cover for the president to avoid criticism and to deliver upon any
commitments offered in the negotiation process.
Scholars employing similar arguments have traditionally drawn from diversionary
explanations of conflict, suggesting that presidents are more likely to use military force when
deteriorating domestic conditions necessitate presidential action (Miller, 1995; Morgan &
Bickers, 1992). The introduction of the electoral cycle as a factor in the choice of foreign policy
options suggests, however, that the use of force should be less likely leading up to Election Day.
Gaubatz (1991) finds that democratic leaders are most likely to use military force early in their
tenures, with that likelihood decreasing as elections near. The explanation for such a finding is
that democratic societies are likely to punish leaders at the polls for pursuing policies that put
lives at risk, even when they are considered a victory (Chiozza & Goemans, 2003). Thus,
impending elections likely cause U.S. presidents to shy away from military conflict, regardless of
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the need for policy success. Substituting diplomacy, however, is likely to be lower-risk. Such a
claim is expected to be limited to democratic governments, as autocrats have incentives to
demonstrate strength—perhaps through a show of force, as procedural elections or other
institutionally-mandated transitions near. In addition to further explaining how domestic political
interests lead presidents to focus a variable amount of attention and resources toward mediation,
these findings also inform the conflict resolution literature more generally, by calling into
question the efficacy of democratic states as peace makers.
Leaders are also likely to consider their level of political support when choosing to offer
mediation. The literature suggests that presidents become more aggressive in their use of foreign
policy when they enjoy significant legislative cover—in the shape of a majority of co-partisans
in the legislature (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007)—or when they are able to pass legislation
efficiently (Foster & Palmer, 2006; Ragsdale, 1998). Thus, presidents with higher levels of
support in Congress should be more confident in their ability to mediate overseas conflicts and
should have greater access to resources to do so successfully.
Empirical results support the notion that U.S. presidents are more likely to engage in
mediation when they enjoy significant political cover, suggesting that such an endeavor
constitutes a net spending of political capital. However, there is minimal support for the
argument that presidents’ focus on mediation is influenced by the election cycle, or that the
election cycle creates an inverse conditional relationship in the special case where an incumbent
president is running for re-election and lacks Congressional support necessary to pass legislation.
Such results, taken together, imply that presidents are constrained by domestic politics when
considering mediation as a foreign policy option. Moreover, they comport with the notion of a
“prudent public,” whereby presidents are unable to use foreign policy selectively to generate
quick boosts in public approval or help win elections, due to voters’ understanding of the
national interest and the political motivations of such behavior (Jentleson, 1992). Finally, the
results illustrate that the decision to offer mediation is likely made primarily as the result of
domestic political calculations, while less attention is being paid to the conflict conditions and
the “ripeness” for resolutions. Such a result also helps to explain why mediation attempts are
often unsuccessful, despite the number of resources that the U.S. can bring to bear in the
endeavor. Without sufficient legislative support, presidents are unlikely to be able to mobilize
their full contingent of resources, as doing so would be politically costly. Moreover, such results
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imply that because presidential administrations focus on diplomacy when domestic conditions
will likely minimize costs, less attention is being paid to the conflict conditions and their ripeness
for resolution, aligning with existing scholarship (Grieg, 2005).
While the results are limited to the United States in scope, they open the door for
comparative inquiry and suggest that states’ domestic institutional configuration, not power, may
be the determining factor in the ability to credibly commit to a mediation effort that will yield a
peaceful resolution of conflict. The next sections discuss the literature supporting the rationale
for such a study, develop two potential theoretical models for testing, explain the methodology
and tests employed, and finally interpret the results and expound on their implications.
States as Mediators
Powerful states are the most common state mediators of international conflicts. The
United States is the most common mediator, accounting for 31% of single-state mediation
attempts from 1945-1999, while permanent members of the United Nations Security Council
account for a total of 42.5% of single-state mediation efforts over that period (Bercovitch &
Schneider, 2000). States appeal to belligerents as mediators, as opposed to intergovernmental
organizations, private citizens, or other international bodies, because of the numerous resources
that they can provide to manipulate the conflict landscape and their ability to overcome
collective action problems. Additionally, a large number of mediation efforts are initiated by the
mediator, rather than one or both of the belligerents (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000; Bercovitch
& Fretter, 2007). Such occurrences suggest that state leaders see mediation as an avenue through
which they can benefit politically. Therefore, identifying the conditions under which leaders see
conflict resolution as a politically useful endeavor is necessary toward understanding the
likelihood that the conflict resolution attempt will lead to peace. It is also key to grasping the full
dynamics of the mediation process.
This discussion suggests that state mediators’ primary motivations are not necessarily
resolution of the conflict, but rather some political benefit. As such, the motivations of the state
and its political actors should be considered when assessing the likelihood that mediation will be
offered, and if mediation attempts will be successful (Beardsley & Grieg, 2009; Touval &
Zartman, 1985; Touval, 1992), as well as, whether the agreement reached will last (Werner and
Yuen 2005). The question that stems from this broad analysis of state actors as mediators is:
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what political dimension drives states to want to engage in mediation and what factors restrain
states from doing so?
Given that powerful states are most adept at using manipulative mediation strategies,
taken along with research suggesting that manipulative interventions most often lead to shortlived agreements (Beardsley, 2011), it can be argued that state actors engaging in mediation are
primarily driven by the political benefits of such a short-term agreement. By manipulating the
payoff structures for conflicting parties, states do little to mollify the underlying sources of
conflict. Instead, they simply make the benefits of peace (as opposed to resolved conflict) worth
the costs, which are somewhat reduced. Moreover, these findings suggest that leaders of
democratic states deem the increased resources and effort needed to ensure a more durable peace
agreement through mediation will yield little marginal political benefit at home. Because these
leaders stay in power by appealing to a domestic audience, the primary goal of any mediation
attempt is to impress that domestic audience, or at least key members and groups of it. Thus, an
understanding of mediation within the dynamics of leader decision-making is necessary to fully
explain its occurrence and process.
Mediation as a Foreign Policy Decision
Those who have examined mediator motivations systematically have argued that the
decision to mediate occurs within the context of the existing foreign policy landscape, and also
have criticized the conflict resolution program for largely ignoring such a fact (Touval, 2003;
Touval & Zartman, 1985). However, to the extent that mediator motivations have been tested,
examinations have been limited to structural explanations of foreign policy, focusing on alliance,
economic, and historical ties (Kleiboer, 2002; Greig & Regan, 2008; Touval & Zartman, 1985);
more importantly, these studies have not focused on how domestic political factors affect leader
decision-making. Such an approach fit well within the Cold War thinking that international
relations trumped domestic politics. States conducted foreign policy as rational unitary actors
constantly seeking to increase their security (Waltz, 1979). This rationale explained key Cold
War cases, such as mediation of the Falklands Crisis, where the U.S. intervened to maintain
stability among key allies. This approach has driven how scholars have explained mediator
motivations. However, in doing so they overlook key dynamics in the conflict resolution process.
Specifically, these explanations have difficulty explaining why there is variation in states’
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willingness to engage in mediation across time (even within one conflict), and why there is
variation in the mediation strategies that states employ.
Another important consideration is the non-use of mediation in U.S. foreign policy.
Conflict mediation is most often thought to be a liberal foreign policy approach, using soft power
and influence rather than coercion to peacefully resolve conflict. Thus, the conventional wisdom
suggests that leaders whose ideological standpoint prefers dovish foreign policy approaches are
more likely to favor mediation as a policy option. Thus, while the U.S. presidents, as leaders of a
powerful democratic country, are more likely to engage in mediation than autocratic leaders,
there is also likely to be variation in the extent of mediation behavior based on party identity,
where Democratic presidents are more likely to engage in mediation than Republican presidents.
Such an argument stems from not only the notion that ideology is likely to drive foreign policy
behavior, but also because of arguments suggesting that the primary domestic audience that
leaders are courting through their foreign policy decisions are their own political supporters
(Morgan & Bickers, 1992). However, research also suggests that while dovish leaders are likely
to default to cooperative foreign policy measures, such measures can lack credibility due to the
lack of sunk political costs. Thus, while mediation is likely to be offered less often by hawkish
leaders, those that do occur are more likely to be successful because hawkish political leaders are
putting more at stake, reputationally, by engaging in peacemaking (Schultz, 2005).
Because there is considerable fluctuation in interest from states in resolving ongoing
conflicts over time, a state-centric model of mediator motivation is not sufficient. For instance,
the U.S. has at times committed large quantities of resources to resolving the ongoing conflict
between Israelis, Palestinians, and the neighboring Arab states—including a great deal of the
president’s political capital—while at other times, the incumbent administration focuses its
attention elsewhere. Moreover, U.S. involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict is primarily driven
by domestic political interests (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). Mediation is a less popular foreign
policy option when the U.S. is involved in conflict as a belligerent, as can be seen by the lack of
interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict after the onset of the Iraq War in 2003, when there had been
considerable interest in the lead up to the war. Because resources and attention are being
occupied by the conflict in which the U.S. is directly involved and democratically-elected leaders
are likely pay electoral consequences for failures in war, it is less likely that U.S. presidents will
divert effort and resources to third-party mediation under such circumstances (Chiozza &
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Goemans, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995). Therefore, seeking to explain mediation
occurrence (and offers) requires a more nuanced approach to foreign policy decision making:
one that recognizes that diplomacy is chosen as one policy option out of the many that state
leaders have at their disposal. A calculated political decision process takes place in choosing to
focus on mediation from this range of policy options, which includes domestic and international
endeavors and their likely ramifications. Contemporary scholarship on foreign policy has
focused on political leaders as the key players in decision-making. Because U.S. presidents act in
both domestic and international politics, but are ultimately held accountable by a democratic
voting audience, foreign policy endeavors are likely to be undertaken with their domestic
political ramifications in mind. Similarly, leaders can attempt to use foreign policy as a tool to
improve their domestic political standing. Thus, not only do international factors constrain
domestic politics, as neorealism contends, but domestic motivations and constraints influence the
way that leaders behave internationally.
Mediation and Foreign Policy Substitution: A “Record of Success”
Historical evidence suggests that the voting public can often be rallied in favor of propeace political candidates (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Brace & Hinckley, 1994). As such,
incumbents may have incentives to use the tools of their office similarly, pursuing a
peacemaking-focused foreign policy agenda. In 2008, Barack Obama ran for president on a
peace-centered foreign policy platform, seeking to appeal to a war-weary public. Dwight
Eisenhower sought the peacemaker perception toward the end of his tenure in office, as he
engaged in talks with the Soviet Union in order to bolster the prospects of Republican candidates
in the 1960 elections (Hughes, 1962). Similarly, Lyndon Johnson consciously sought to appear
as a peacemaker in 1968, halting strategic bombings of Vietnam in the lead-up to elections, and
even Richard Nixon used the power of his office to create the image of pro-peace foreign policy,
and maintain public support, by timing troop withdrawals from Vietnam (Burbach, 2004).
Research also suggests that political leaders can indeed boost domestic approval ratings by
engaging in high-profile mediation efforts (Todhunter, 2013). Such occurrences are well
explained by the concept of foreign policy substitutability (Most & Starr, 1984). However, a
significant body of research suggests that the American public is sufficiently “prudent” in their
responses to foreign policy endeavors, primarily the use and threat of military force, and thus can
discern when such an effort is conducted in the national interest, and when it is simply a political
7

maneuver (Jentleson, 1992: Jentleson & Britton, 1998). Such a dichotomy implies that there may
be incentives to actively use diplomacy to boost a president’s domestic standing, while at the
same time an argument can be made that presidents are likely to be punished for doing so.
The literature on leader survival suggests that democratically-elected leaders are likely to
be punished for military failure, and as the probability that they will lose office increases, the
likelihood that they will engage in the use of force decreases (Chiozza & Goemans, 2003).
Unlike the use of force, mediation has less potential to be a politically expensive policy choice
because it incurs few costs up front and does not ultimately bear many of the costs of failure.
Mediating an overseas dispute not only lacks the potential for violent loss of life associated with
military force, it also requires considerably less commitment of resources and political capital
from the mediator at the outset, which in turn minimizes the risk that must be accepted in
attempting to extract a political benefit. Mediation is also more ideologically congruent with
democracy and thus likely to be well-received both domestically and internationally. However, it
can also be argued that with the aim of consolidating a domestic payoff through mediation of a
foreign conflict, some level of success is necessary, rather than just the attempt at doing so.
Achieving such a success, especially over the long term, likely requires the commitment of
resources and support from Congress.
Failure to succeed in mediation may be less likely to negatively impact a president’s
political fortunes than failure in other policy areas. Research suggests that democratic leaders
may be punished electorally for the use of force, even if it is thought to be successful (Chiozza &
Goemans, 2011). As a mediator, however, a president may have less to lose. Should a president
deem that mediation of a particular conflict will not yield the previously expected political
benefits, or if negotiations should break down, he can walk away having committed very few
resources to the process. Ultimately, however, presidents are likely to seek out policy options
that have a greater probability of success. Because presidential success in mediation is likely to
depend on his ability to introduce resources to the negotiation process, support in Congress will
likely be necessary. Moreover, support from Congress will likely diffuse the negative impact of
failure and make the mediation effort more credible to the disputing parties.
Theories of Congressional Support, Elections, and Mediation
The theoretical argument stemming from this discussion begins with the assumption that
presidents attempt to establish a record of policy successes to better their political fortunes and
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those of their co-partisans (Neustadt 1960; Bond & Fleisher, 1990; Richards, et al.,1993). To do
so, presidential administrations are most likely to focus on domestic policies, with which
domestic political audiences can closely identify, and foreign policies enabling mobilization of
considerable resources with high likelihood of success. Thus, mediation is most likely to occur
when the president enjoys broad Congressional support, to mobilize numerous resources and
send a strong signal to belligerents about commitment to the endeavor. Such a proposition is
consistent with the “party cover” conjecture, which contends that leaders are likely to make risky
foreign policy commitments when enjoying considerable legislative support, to minimize
criticism from opposition and to share blame for any failures that result (Howell & Pevehouse,
2005; Kriner, 2010). At the same time, given the argument that presidents’ primary motivation
for engaging in mediation is to engineer a policy success that improves domestic political
standing, the lack of legislative support can be a constraint on the offer of mediation. Such an
argument supports the notion that the offer of mediation is most often made independently of the
conflict conditions, and it explains why, despite the resources and power involved, mediation
efforts are unsuccessful (Grieg, 2005).
An additional theoretical consideration in need of testing, in the U.S. case, is the level of
independence and primacy afforded the president in the foreign policy arena. Because the
president can act on foreign policy matters without the consent of Congress, it can be argued
plausibly that diplomatic efforts such as diplomacy may be appealing at times when an
opposition Congress makes the passage of legislation difficult. In fact, when the Congressional
majority is comprised of the opposition party to the president’s, members of that party likely
have incentives to limit cooperation with the administration and increase the fortunes of their
own candidate in coming elections (Mayer, 2001; Howell & Pevehouse, 2005). Scholars have
made the “policy availability” argument that vulnerable presidents seek to substitute foreign
policy when domestic policy options are not available, and political conditions necessitate a
policy victory (Brulé, 2006; 2008; Marshall & Prins, 2011). While it is unlikely that engaging in
mediation would produce a rally similar to that of a use force, it could potentially be an
appealing policy option when the administration wants to minimize risk.
Upcoming elections create political vulnerability for presidents. As elections approach,
presidents should want to minimize risk while maximizing policy success. Such a perspective is
supported by the literature that suggests leaders are less likely to use military force as the
9

chances that they will be removed from office increase (Chiozza & Goemans, 2003/2011;
Gaubatz; 1991; Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003). Thus, when confronted with both an opposition
Congress and a need to engineer policy successes due to nearing elections, presidents have
incentives to focus on foreign policy for building this desired record of success. Because
presidents who use force as elections near are likely to be punished by voters, they generally use
military force early in their tenures (Gaubatz, 1991). Moreover, there is evidence in the literature
that suggests audience costs are non-linear over a president’s term, and that presidents engage in
more hand-tying behavior closer to elections (Chiozza, 2017). Thus, in situations where domestic
policy avenues are largely unavailable to the president, yet nearing elections create a need for
high-profile policy successes, mediating overseas conflicts should be an attractive policy avenue
for presidents. Because mediation is both high-profile and low-risk, relative to other available
policy options, a high payoff for a presidential administration is likely. Therefore, the argument
suggests, a greater number of mediations should be seen in these situations.
Hypotheses
The proposed argument suggests several hypotheses about the role that domestic politics
plays in influencing mediation. The first hypothesis concerns the expected volume of mediation,
given the president’s support in Congress. It is expected that presidents will engage in mediation
at times when they enjoy broad support from Congress and have an established record of
legislative success:
Hypothesis 1: Presidential administrations are more likely to engage in more mediations
at times they experience higher levels of legislative support from Congress.
The notion that presidents are likely to seek out policy options that have higher
probabilities of success supports such a proposition. Moreover, guarantees and resources offered
in the mediation process will need Congressional backing to be realized. Additionally,
considerable Congressional support provides the president cover from criticism and can help to
diffuse blame, should the effort fail. A credible signal is also sent to the disputants that the
president is committed to the endeavor, making it a more appealing proposition for them.
Next, the influence of the election cycle on mediation is considered. Presidents need to
build a record of policy successes so as to be re-elected and to further the political fortunes of
their party. Foreign policy is a high-profile policy outlet in which the president has a great deal
of autonomy. However, military options are less likely under these conditions—presidents are
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less likely to use military force as elections approach because of increased chances of electoral
punishment, even when such actions are deemed successful. Diplomatic endeavors, like
mediation, may indeed be appealing policy substitutes, as they have the potential to be highprofile, but relatively lower risk:
Hypothesis 2: Presidential administrations are more likely to engage in more mediation
efforts as elections near.
A second argument, related to elections and mediation worthy of testing, focuses
specifically on instances in which the incumbent president is running for re-election. While a
president is likely to want to build a record of success to help co-partisans in addition to his own
political fortunes, it can be argued the incentives to pursue high-profile policy intended to build a
record of success should be magnified when the incumbent is standing for re-election, as lame
duck presidents will not benefit over the long term from the domestic payoffs associated with
mediation:
Hypothesis 3: Presidential administrations are more likely to engage in more mediation
efforts as elections near, and the incumbent is running for re-election.
In addition to more separation of the intent for individual and party benefit from the
policy endeavor, situations in which the incumbent is running for re-election likely increases the
appeal of a mediator to the disputants. Given that the incumbent needs the policy victory to help
get re-elected, more resources and guarantees are likely to made available, thus increasing the
payoffs for standing down.
Finally, the policy availability argument suggests a that Congressional support may have
a conditioning effect on the impact of the election cycle on a presidential administration’s
mediation behavior. Because an opposition Congress has incentives to block domestic policy
options leading up to an election, presidents have greater incentives to focus on foreign policy, as
it is an area in which they enjoy greater autonomy. Further, diplomatic options should be more
appealing, as research suggests that presidents are less likely to use military force with
impending elections:
Hypothesis 4: Presidential administrations are more likely to engage in more mediations
at times they experience lower levels of legislative success, as elections near.
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An argument can also be made that the focus on mediation should be most likely when
the incumbent is running for re-election. Incumbents have distinct advantages over their
challengers in building a record of success, as they have numerous political resources at their
disposal. Therefore, in situations where Congress is unlikely to be cooperative, presidents
running for re-election should seek out policy options where Congress has less influence.
Hypothesis 5: Presidential administrations are more likely to engage in more mediations
at times they experience lower levels of legislative success, as elections near and the
incumbent is running for re-election.
While Congressional support would still be necessary to implement many of the
guarantees offered as the result of a mediation effort, it is plausible that given the limited options
present, presidents would be inclined to use mediation with the goal of generating momentum for
a policy that was publicly popular.
These hypotheses make explicit, testable statements about the influence Congressional
support and impending elections on the president’s propensity to initiate mediation efforts. Like
other policy options, the president generally should be seen engaging in mediation when robust
Congressional support provides the administration with considerable resources and political
capital to engineer a peaceful resolution of conflict. Under such conditions the president has
incentives to use foreign policy to generate a record of policy success. Additionally, disputing
parties are likely to perceive mediation offers from a president as credible due to broad
legislative support, increasing the likelihood that the offer is accepted and mediation is
successful. Moreover, elections likely contribute to presidents’ increased focus on mediation as
presidents are prone to engage in more hand-tying behavior as they near, and are also likely to
become more risk averse. A hostile Congress likely conditions the influence that elections have
on mediation, as presidents need to generate a record of policy successes, but have limited policy
avenues available to them. The next section describes the empirical research design for testing
the hypotheses.
Research Design
To test the hypotheses, I examined the influence of election cycles and executivelegislative relationships on U.S. mediation efforts since World War II, observing the data
quarterly.
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The dependent variable, Mediation, represents a count of mediation efforts initiated by
the U.S. government in a given quarter. The source data for the measure of mediation was
Bercovitch’s (1999) International Conflict Management (ICM) dataset, which coded the identity
of mediators who engage in mediations with disputing parties. Each mediation attempted, or
offered, was verified to have been conducted on behalf of the U.S. government. Cases where
U.S. citizens mediated privately, such Jimmy Carter’s involvement in Haiti, are excluded. The
data was observed quarterly and Mediation reflects a count of new mediation efforts during the
quarter. Because each individual meeting was coded as a mediation attempt, an increase in
mediation volume represents an increased focus by the administration on mediation. U.S.
Mediations is described in Table 1. It ranges in value from 0 to 8 new mediation attempts per
quarter. The mean is 1.398 new mediation attempts per quarter, with a standard deviation of
1.429 and a variance of 2.041. No new mediations occurred in 60 quarters, or 29.85% of the
time. A single new mediation attempt was undertaken in 62 quarters, or 30.85% of the time,
while 2 new mediations occurred in 48 quarters, or 23.88% of the time, and 4 new mediation
attempts occurred, or 8.46% of the time. There are 13 quarters in which 4 to 8 new mediation
attempts occurred, comprising roughly 7% of the sample.
The primary explanatory variable is a measure of the president’s legislative support in
Congress. Presidential success corresponds to the percentage of Congressional roll call votes
that concurred with the president’s position (Ragsdale, 1998). This measure directly captures the
president’s ability to pursue remedial policy using legislation, and is a more direct indicator of
the effects of divided government on policy outputs (see e.g., Foster, 2006). Given that both
chambers of Congress must approve the president’s proposal, a score is used that corresponds to
the chamber in which the presidential success score is lower.
The frequency of mediation efforts is hypothesized to be a function of the election cycle.
Election, measures the U.S. presidential election cycle. A “1” is coded for each election year and
the second two quarters of the preceding year. Because opposition candidates begin to emerge in
the latter half of the year prior to presidential elections, and the electoral landscape becomes the
most salient topic of political discourse, such a time frame is likely to see the president
attempting to shore up public support. Moreover, the role that domestic audience costs play in
influencing foreign policy is thought to be greater during election cycles (Chiozza, 2017). Re-
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election is coded according to the same scheme as Election, but only for quarters leading up to
elections in which the incumbent is running for re-election.
Because hypotheses 4 and 5 are conditional, presidential support in Congress is interacted
with the election cycle variable to assess the effect of elections on mediation efforts conditioned
by Congress. The marginal effects for the interaction terms should indicate a relationship
between impending elections and an increase in the propensity for mediation during periods in
which Congressional opposition is sufficient to block presidential domestic policy reform (Kam
& Franzese, 2005; Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006).
The frequency of mediation is hypothesized to be a function of Congressional support
and the election cycle. However, because the president is trying to manipulate public opinion and
engineer electoral success, his actions are likely to be driven by his popularity. Thus, a measure
of presidential approval is included to capture the public’s evaluation of the president’s job
performance. Presidential approval is measured as the quarterly average of all Gallup
presidential job approval polls.
In addition, controls are used to account for quarterly Uses of force. Presidents making
the decision to deploy military forces against targets abroad are likely to have less time or
motivation to consider peacemaking efforts. Consequently, as the number of uses of force
increases, presidents should initiate fewer mediation efforts. Uses of force are drawn from the
Blechman-Kaplan/Fordham list of U.S. uses of force (Fordham, 1998; Fordham & Sarver, 2002).
In a similar fashion, a variable indicating War, which taps U.S. war involvement, is included.
The United States’ involvement in wars is likely to reduce the pool of available resources with
which presidents can address other crises. Thus, the analysis controls for the impact of wars by
including a dummy variable that takes on the value of “1” for quarters in which the U.S. was
involved in the Korean, Vietnam, and first Gulf War.
Negative binomial regression estimates are employed to test the hypotheses. Because the
dependent variable, U.S. Mediations, is an over-dispersed event count variable Poisson
regression models are not appropriate, as they assume that the mean is equal to the variance.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for U.S. Mediations. The variance, 2.041, is considerably
larger than the mean, 1.398. Such a conclusion is supported by the alpha statistic generated with
each of the models (see Table 2). In each case, the alpha statistic is significantly different than
zero, suggesting that the negative binomial estimator is more appropriate (Long & Freese, 2006).
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However, because the Poisson regression model has smaller confidence intervals than the
negative binomial estimator, Poisson models were also run as a robustness check. The results did
not differ in significance or substance from the negative binomial estimates.
Results and Discussion
Table 2 shows the negative binomial estimates for the relationships between the
Congressional success of the president, which is thought to be a direct measure of the effects of
divided government, the election cycle, and U.S. mediation efforts across quarters from 19491995. Robust standard errors are clustered around presidential administrations. Model 1.1
measures the effect of presidential success, independent of elections. Model 1.2 introduces the
election variable and Model 1.3 introduces the re-election variable. Models 1.4 and 1.5 test the
conditioning effect that presidential success exerts over the election cycle’s influence on U.S.
mediations.
The empirical results support the argument that presidents are likely to engage in a higher
volume of mediation endeavors at times when they enjoy broad support in Congress. Model 1.1
shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between presidential success in
Congress and the number of new mediation efforts initiated. Substantively, the model suggests
that at the mean presidential success score, with all other variables held constant (continuous
variables at their means and dichotomous variables at zero), presidents are likely to engage in
1.644 new mediation attempts per quarter. A one standard deviation increase from the mean in
the presidential success score (17.715 percentage points), suggests that, on average, presidents
will begin 1.900 new mediations per quarter. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in the
presidential success score suggests roughly a 14% increase in mediation activity. The impact is
similar for model 1.2, which controls for elections, suggests that a one standard deviation
increase from the mean in presidential success is likely to yield approximately a 12% increase in
mediation activity.
Additionally, the positive and significant relationship between presidential success is still
observed when the election cycle variables are introduced. However, according to models 1.2
and 1.3, Election and Re-election, respectively, are negatively associated with the volume of new
mediation efforts. However, no statistically significant relationship is observed. Such results
suggest that the election cycle has no statistically significant impact on presidents’ mediation
activity. Thus, presidents are not increasing their mediation activity in order to improve their
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electoral prospects or those of their party. Interestingly, however, these results differ from
research on the use of force leading up to elections, where strong negative associations are found
(Gaubatz, 1991; Williams, 2013). These studies argued that the use of military force decreases as
elections near, due to the fact that leaders fear electoral punishment for subjecting voters to the
costs of conflict. These results may imply that while leaders do not seek to increase mediation
activity in order to get produce positive results at the ballot box, the fears of punishment that are
present with the use of military force are absent. However, mediation, like many foreign policy
endeavors, is most likely to occur at times when the president is politically secure. Such a result
is consistent with the notion that despite relative autonomy in foreign policy, presidents prefer
broad party cover to minimize criticism and share blame for shortcomings, while maximizing the
number of political and economic resources that can be committed to the effort when mediating
(Howell & Pevehouse, 2005).
Models 1.4 and 1.5 test conditional relationships between presidential success in
Congress and election cycles. Thus, the hypotheses suggest that the influence that the election
cycle has on mediation activity varies, depending on a president’s level of Congressional
success. Model 1.4 examines the extent to which presidential success conditions the influence of
all presidential election cycles on the frequency of mediation, while model 1.5 examines the
extent to which presidential success conditions those election cycles where the incumbent is
running for re-election. Because the models involve interaction terms, testing the extent to which
one independent variable’s influence on the dependent variable is conditioned by the value of a
second independent variable, a graphical depiction is most useful for interpretation of both
association and levels of certainty (Kam & Franzese, 2005; Brambor, Clark & Golder, 2006).
Thus, to properly assess statistical significance, the marginal effects of presidential success on
the election and re-election cycles are plotted, in conjunction with upper and lower 95%
confidence levels, across the range of the presidential success variable.
Models 1.4 and 1.5 behave as expected, in terms of direction, but fail to demonstrate
statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. As expected, the slope of the marginal effects
curve is negative for both models. However, the lack of statistical significance suggests that no
systematic conclusions can be made about the hypothesized relationship. In sum, legislatively
weak presidents are not seen using mediation differently than those who are more successful in
Congress during the election cycle, regardless of re-election status. Therefore, support for the
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“policy availability” argument cannot be confirmed. The lack of an observed relationship also
implies that presidents view diplomacy differently than the use of military force, though both fall
under the realm of foreign policy when it comes to engineering a policy success. While it has
been argued that presidents seek to substitute foreign policy at times when domestic policy
avenues are unavailable or are inefficient, these results suggest that those arguments are limited
to the use of military force. The results are consistent with the notion of a prudent public
regarding foreign policy, which contends that the public is likely able to discern between policy
activity that serves national interests and activities that are engineered to provide leaders with the
appearance of success.
Control variables used in the models behave largely as expected and yield some
interesting insight. As expected, the dichotomous variable for war is negatively correlated with
the frequency of U.S. mediations, and statistically significant across the models. Substantively,
when the U.S. is engaged in war, the number of new mediations expected in a given quarter
drops from 1.610 to 0.954, or 41% decrease in mediation activity. Thus, involvement in war
makes it considerably less likely that presidents will engage in peacemaking endeavors, as doing
so would likely divert resources, political and material, from the war effort. No relationship is
observed between uses of force, short of war and mediation, however.
In all, the empirical results in these models provide support for the argument that
presidents are likely to engage in mediation at times when they enjoy broad support in Congress.
Thus, mediation is most likely undertaken under similar domestic political conditions as many
other types of foreign policy. However, the results also suggest that presidents do not use
mediation as a policy tool to help improve their electoral fortunes or engineer a policy success,
as has been shown to be the case with saber-rattling and the use of military force. These
conclusions are consistent with the notion that presidents are risk averse in foreign policy and
thus seek to conduct international affairs when they are least likely to be criticized, and most
likely to be successful. These results also suggest that presidents are constrained in their use of
mediation by domestic political considerations, and that mediation efforts will become less
appealing policy options for presidents in need of policy successes to help their domestic
political fortunes.
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Implications of the Results
The results observed herein suggest several important implications for the study of
conflict resolution, as well as that of foreign policy decision-making. Broadly speaking, the
results suggest that research on the motivations of states as third-party mediators needs to look
beyond the state interest to incorporate domestic politics and institutional rules. Doing so also
creates several opportunities for future research. Initially, the results presented here may appear
to be sui generis to the U.S. case. Indeed, these arguments hinge on the constitutional separation
of powers and the executive’s primacy in U.S. foreign policy. However, given that an
overarching goal of the conflict resolution research program is to understand the factors that
make peaceful conflict settlement more likely, it is important to consider the extent to which
domestic factors drive and constrain mediation efforts. The United States is thought to be an
appealing mediator due to its position as a superpower in the international system. It can bring
numerous resources to bear in any mediation effort. However, given that the offer of mediation is
likely driven and constrained by domestic political considerations, largely because of
institutional configurations, many U.S. mediation efforts may lack sufficient credibility, leading
to the observation that many of them are ultimately unsuccessful.
The observation that U.S. presidents are likely to be cautious in pursuing mediation,
doing so at times when they enjoy broad Congressional success, is increasingly important to the
understanding of conflict resolution processes as divided government becomes the norm in the
United States and legislative production decreases. While the United States has traditionally been
deemed an appealing mediator due to its broad international interests, its role as a global leader,
and its ability to commit significant tangible resources to the negotiation process, it can
manipulate the payoffs for otherwise obstinate belligerents. Given the observation that the
commitment of such resources is likely to hinge upon a record of legislative success in Congress,
the trend toward divided government suggests that mediation will become less common in U.S.
foreign policy. As such, a more complete examination of the market for mediators will be
necessary.
These results also suggest that comparative examination of domestic political influences
on mediation efforts would likely bring to light institutional arrangements that lead to more
credible mediation efforts by states. For, instance parliamentary democracies, in which the
executive and legislative functions are linked, likely make more credible offers of mediation.
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Because the government risks a vote of no confidence due to policy failure, mediation offers, as
well as other risky foreign policy endeavors, are likely to be less common. However, those that
are made are more likely to be credible, with significant political and economic resources
committed by the government to ensure a policy success. Because parliamentary governments
lack the level of separation between the executive and legislative branches, they are more likely
to be legislatively productive. Thus, they will likely engage in foreign policy with greater
credibility and will be able to signal a greater commitment to the effort. Greater commitment
from a less powerful mediator may yield more durable conflict resolution results. Such a
proposition has not yet been tested empirically.
Similarly, conflict resolution research would benefit from more systematic, cross-national
analysis of the resources and skills that certain states can utilize in building peace. Several
studies argue that individual states are better-suited to engage in mediation, regardless of
international power considerations, because of national character, the nature of domestic civil
society, and both the political and private social infrastructure that exist (see e.g., Moolakkattu,
2005). Systematic examinations of such factors would work to enrich theories of state
motivations and conflict resolution.
There are also several opportunities for further inquiry in the research on foreign policy
decision-making. While domestic political considerations and institutional relationships clearly
impact the appeal of diplomacy as a vehicle to build a record of political success, the use of
mediation as an isolated dependent variable may be in appropriate. Pooling all forms of
diplomacy (see e.g., Melin, 2014), or studying diplomacy and the use of military force together,
are likely to yield interesting and useful insights that might explain presidential behavior more
completely. As it is well established that dovish leaders are more likely to offer mediation, but
hawkish leaders are more likely to be successful mediators, a broader examination of mediation
with more precise and leader-focused data is appropriate.
The results presented here are also consistent with the notion that the U.S. public is
prudent when it comes to assessing the value of foreign policy efforts to the national interest
(Jentleson, 1992). While the political use of military force has been shown to lead to short-lived
spikes in presidential approval, commanding an extensive literature on diversionary conflict, this
study suggests that the logic of diversionary efforts does not extend to the strategic use of thirdparty mediation.
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Conclusion
The notion that leaders seek to use foreign policy to improve their standing with the
public, and thus their electoral fortunes, is relatively uncontroversial among scholars. This study
set out to test the applicability theories explaining foreign policy actions as tools for domestic
gain, to third-party mediation. The role that diplomacy plays in such a dynamic, and the role that
domestic political conditions play in shaping presidential incentives, has not been considered.
Given that there is considerable variation in the focus on mediation across presidential
administrations, while the same opportunities are present in the form of ongoing conflicts,
examining domestic politics as the source of such variation is appropriate. The results presented
here suggest domestic political factors play a key role in determining when mediation is chosen
as a policy option. However, these results suggest that rather than creating incentives for
mediation, domestic politics serves as a constraint. Presidents are seen focusing on mediation at
times when they enjoy broad support in Congress and thus are likely to experience minimal
criticism of their endeavor, and can count on the availability of resources to manipulate the
landscape of negotiations. Moreover, taken with contemporary trends in U.S. politics, the
findings suggest that mediation will become less common in U.S. foreign policy. Because they
U.S. has traditionally been an appealing mediator to belligerents, greater cross-national
understanding of the supply-side factors that contribute to successful mediation is warranted.
Including the dynamics of a mediator’s domestic political situation in models of conflict
resolution processes should contribute to a better understanding of the factors that lead to
peaceful settlement of disputes and thus should become more common in mainstream conflict
resolution studies.
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Appendices
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Mediations
N = 201
Mean = 1.398
New US Mediations (per
quarter)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

Standard Deviation = 1.429
Variance = 2.041
Frequency
Percent
60
62
48
17
6
4
1
2
1
201

29.85
30.85
23.88
8.46
2.99
1.99
0.50
1.00
0.50
100.00
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Table 2: Effect of Legislative Support on U.S. Mediation (Quarterly Data, Negative
Binomial Estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential
administration)
Independent
Variables
Model 1.1
Model 1.2
Model 1.3
Model 1.4
Model 1.5
Presidential
Success

0.008
(0.003)***

0.007
(0.003)**

0.008
(0.003)**

0.013
(0.006)**

0.012
(0.005)**

Election

___

___

___

Election x
Presidential
success
Re-election x
Presidential
success
GDP Growth

___

___

-0.090
(0.129)
___

1.051
(0.814)
___

___

Re-election

-0.172
(0.152)
___

___

___

___

___

-0.021
(0.017)

-0.011
(0.012)

-0.009
(0.012)

-0.011
(0.012)

-0.015
(0.011)

-0.015
(0.011)

-0.011
(0.008)

-0.012
(0.008)

-0.011
(0.008)

-0.011
(0.007)

-0.010
(0.007)

-0.529
(0.167)***

-0.521
(0.162)***

-0.532
(0.160)***

-0.485
(0.150)***

-0.543
(0.167)***

Uses of Force

-0.025
(0.032)

-0.023
(0.035)

-0.023
(0.033)

-0.008
(0.034)

-0.011
(0.038)

Constant

0.694
(0.595)

0.827
(0.657)

0.741
(0.606)

0.409
(0.559)

0.392
(0.475)

0.172
(0.102)**

0.166
(0.106)**

0.170
(0.104)**

0.132
(0.067)**

0.137
(0.060)**

172

172

172

172

172

Approval

War

Alpha

N

-0.021
(0.014)

1.153
(1.030)
___

Note: Dependent variable is quarterly US mediation attempts. Robust standard errors, clustered
on presidential administration, in parentheses, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *.10, two-tailed tests.
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Figure 1: The Effect of Election Cycle, Conditioned by
Presidential Success, on US Mediations (Quarterly Data)
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Figure 2: The Effect of Re-election Cycle, Conditioned by
Presidential Success, on US Mediations (Quarterly Data)
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